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rAbstract
We sketch a visionary strategy for Europe in which full employment is quickly
regained by 2020, income inequality is reduced and the economies are more
sustainable. We call this scenario “vibrant”. It is contrasted with what would happen
if present policies continue within the European Union (EU) and its member states.
In the vibrant scenario, full employment is regained through more policy attention
toward innovation and its underlying research and development (R&D),
accompanied by more labor mobility within and between EU countries, in
combination with a selective immigration policy based on labor market shortages.
The road to full employment is embedded in a landscape with less income
inequality and more “greening” of EU member states’ economies. We translate the
vibrant scenario into policy proposals distinguishing between the role for the EU and
that of the member states. We hope these proposals will affect the debate about the
future of the European Union, also with regard to the pivotal role and responsibility
of the European Parliament and European Commission.
JEL codes: D31, D33, F55, I23, I24, I25, I28, J11, J18, J21, J31, J64, J83, O31, O38, O52
Keywords: Employment; Labor mobility; Innovation; Income inequality; Competition;
Labor markets; Greening; Happiness1. Introduction
1.1 The need for a vibrant scenario
Europe appears to be unable to respond to the financial crisis. In many EU countries,
real incomes are decreasing while unemployment as well as income inequality are ris-
ing. The EU countries which embraced the common currency are doing worse than
those which decided to not adopt it, even though one could make the case that their
plight could be even greater without the euro. Full employment—an important policy
goal for many European member states—is far out of sight.
The EU has been reacting swiftly and energetically to the economic crisis. It has
done so with umbrella funding for countries in danger of a default, proposals for a
banking union as well as the completion of linking the monetary union with an eco-
nomic one; the latter is proposed with measures to ensure the stability pact’s imple-
mentation in order to keep government budget deficits and debt in check. The
“semester” process has been accepted by the member states, implying that they must
have EU approval for their national budgets before submitting them to their national
Parliament. The “semester” process also implies that the EU delivers country-specificRitzen and Zimmermann; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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for example, they could address research and innovation or labor market regulations.
Still we characterize the present policy approach as “muddling through”, which lacks
the vision and energy to engage in a more promising future with quickly-attainable full
employment. The “muddling through” scenario implies that we not only feel unable to
regain full employment but also unable to increase innovation in our economies, coun-
ter income disequalization in the EU member states, as well as further green the econ-
omies in such a way that our children and grandchildren would also benefit from the
resources and climate which Earth provides.
The Vibrant Europe Forum 2012 developed a vision of vibrancy which cherishes and
supports entrepreneurship, curbs and avoids excessive inequality, places learning, train-
ing and education as a central part of our lives, as well as applies the word “sustainabil-
ity” not solely as environmental threats but also to how we do business and organize
our finances. Here we translate this idea into a scenario which holds the promise to
lead to full employment before or in 2020. We focus on labor reforms without claiming
that other issues like macro policies are unimportant.
First in Chapter 2, we characterize the European labor market in the period 2000–
2010 when almost full employment was achieved in 2007/2008 yet subsequently unrav-
eled. We use the following lines of inquiry for the scenarios (“muddling through” versus
“vibrant”):
 Innovation
 Changes in the production structure
 Employment protection and minimum wage legislation
 Sustainability
 Happiness
Chapter 3 explores the period 2010–2020 as far as the labor market is concerned, on
the basis of questions of economic growth, (un)employment, income inequality and
greening. With rising unemployment, the first four years of this decade have not been
happy ones. The predictions for the rest of this decade tell that employment demand will
gradually grow and be sufficient enough to absorb supply, so that unemployment by 2020
would not exceed 5–10% (Cedefop 2010). However compared to the non-crisis scenario,
some 90 million working years are lost (or some 90 million unemployment years are expe-
rienced). Income inequality will continue to rise in the muddling through scenario.
Section by section in Chapter 3, we consider the alternatives which a vibrant scenario
would bring, such as generating higher growth through more innovation and less in-
come inequality by focusing on redistribution policies, more greening and increased
labor mobility rather than employment protection. In many respects this alternative
follows the ideas of Project Europe 2030 (González 2010), which stood on the shoul-
ders of the Sapir report (2003) and the Lisbon strategy, agreed upon at the European
Council Meeting (March 2000). Europe’s growth strategy (European Commission 2012)
follows these lines yet fails to address labor market and income distribution. We trans-
late this scenario into policy proposals which could affect the development of the
mandate for the European Commission in December 2014 after the forthcoming
European elections and the European policies of the coming years.
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Labor demand and supply
Full employment as a policy goal of most EU member states has been forgotten in many
EU countries. Eurostat (2013) reports that the euro area’s seasonally-adjusted unemploy-
ment rate was 12.2% in September 2013, while the EU-28 unemployment rate was 11.0%
in the same month; in contrast, in the United States (US) it was 7.2%. Yet there are huge
differences among the member states. The lowest unemployment rates were recorded in
Austria (4.9%), Germany (5.2%) and Luxembourg (5.9%), while the highest were in Greece
(27.6%) and Spain (26.6%). These variations reflect the differences in economic develop-
ment, including the policy drivers thereof, as we shall further explore.
Europe had been a success story until an abrupt break in 2008 (Gill and Raiser 2012).
It was precisely in the early years of the 21st century that full employment was nearly
achieved in many EU member states. These achievements were “earned” by economic
policy through “third way” reforms which brought economic growth and employment,
but also greater within-country income inequality, which had previously been decreas-
ing for a long period.
The turning point occurred when the financial crisis hit in 2008 since Europe, com-
pared to the US, seemed to be less capable of overcoming it. Several European coun-
tries were plunged into a sovereign debt crisis, combined with a prolonged recession
with double and triple dips (of GDP growth per capita) in several other EU countries,
such as the UK and the Netherlands. Table 1 shows the (predicted) real growth rates of
the European economies in the period 2012–2015 compared to those of the US and
the world average. This documents the faltering growth which has had severe implica-
tions for European employment, as Table 2 shows.
The tables not only document that the EU performs worse than the US but also that
within the EU, the Euro area fares worse than the non-Euro area countries, largely as a
result of the mal-performance of the countries which could only be rescued from a sov-
ereign default due to the European Emergency Fund.
The EU labor force growth over the period 2000–2010 of some 14 million people
was almost fully absorbed by a growth in employment (Cedefop 2012, p.8). Job growth
was particularly strong in the period 2003–2008, following a stagnant period at the be-
ginning of the century then followed by job losses after 2008.
The (semi-)public sector accounted for more than half of the employment growth in
the first decade of the 21st century. The private sector showed strong growth in the dis-
tribution and transport sectors, as well as in business and other services. Contrarily,
the primary sector, utilities and manufacturing showed substantial job losses. The con-
struction sector grew slightly in the number of jobs (some additional 1 million jobs).Table 1 Real GDP growth rates (forecasts 2013–2015)
2012 2013 2014 2015
Euro Area −0.7 −0.4 1.1 1.7
EU −0.4 0.0 1.4 1.9
US 2.8 1.6 2.6 3.1
World 3.3 3.2 4.0 4.4
Source: EU Commission Staff, 2013 (p.1).
Table 2 Unemployment rate (forecasts 2013–2015)
2012 2013 2014 2015
Euro Area 11.4 12.2 12.2 11.8
EU 10.5 11.1 11.0 10.7
US 8.1 7.5 6.9 6.5
Source: EU Commission Staff, 2013 (p.1).
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public and private sector; we imagine that the public sector in many countries will not
expand in the near future following the substantial expansion in the first decade of this
century. The public sector is more education-intensive than the private sector, in the
sense that the average level of education of those employed in the public sector is
higher.
The crisis (as well as the ensuing government cuts) have resulted in today’s startling
unemployment figures (as of the end of 2013), with their uneven spread around the
EU. Equally startling is the lack of migration from high to low unemployment countries
in the EU, since government regulations have low migration thresholds.
It is also remarkable that in almost all of the EU member states, unemployment by
education level more or less follows overall unemployment; as such, the unemployment
level of highly-qualified people is consistently some 4 percentage points below that of
middle-trained people, which in turn is some 4 to 5 percentage points below that of
low-qualified workers.2.1 Innovation
The last decades have been marked by substantial labor market changes due to existing
or emerging firms with new products or production processes “destroying” the position
of existing products and processes. Innovation is the source of fresh wealth and may in-
crease net employment (Soete 2013), albeit of a different structure in terms of the types
of skills required; this differs both for the production process (highly-qualified, entre-
preneurial and problem-solving skills) as for employment arising from the purchasing
power of the newly created wealth (non-routine service jobs).
EU countries continue to do well on the global innovation index (jointly published by
Cornell University, INSEAD and the World Intellectual Property Organization, 2013):
seven of the top ten are Northwestern European countries; the other three are
Singapore, Hong Kong and the United States. However, the EU as a whole would pre-
sumably rank (far) below the US. Europe’s young leading innovators (called “yollies” for
short) are as R&D-intensive as those in the United States. Europe just has a lot fewer
yollies (Gill and Raiser 2012: p.16): Europe has shown a generally poor performance in
most of the technology-intensive sectors such as the internet, biotechnology, computer
software, healthcare equipment and semiconductors.
In the literature on the relation between economic growth and research, the focus is
often on private sector research as the basis for innovation, while ignoring public re-
search. Mazzucato (2013) strongly contradicts this through the examples of Google and
Apple which could innovate thanks to public research or governments which financed
private research.
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institutional variables in converting research (whether public or private) to innovative
activities. They point to competition and new entrants as factors that bring about
growth through innovation. This supports the inclusion of a variable on the “ease of
doing business” in the Coe et al. analysis (2009).
Moving from public research to labor productivity, a process called valorization,
many factors seem to play a role, such as:
 Co-publications between industry and academia
 The inclination to apply for patents and the (inter)national organization of patents
 The ease of doing business (World Bank 2013)
 The entrepreneurial culture and the contribution of education to nurture it
 Credit availability2.2 Wage inequality, income inequality and social cohesion
Wage income inequality is rising due to changes in the production structure
Wage inequality increased in Europe in the period 2000–2010 mostly as a result of the
long-run changes in the production structure in which non-routine work became in-
creasingly more important, whereas the relevance of routine work decreased. The
changes in the production structure are illustrated by the increase in the wage premium
of higher education graduates (for all OECD countries for the period 1997–2003) when
the supply of graduates increased (Machin and McNally 2007). If the production struc-
ture would have remained the same, the increased supply of graduates would have led
to lower wages. Tinbergen (1975) captured this as the “race between education and
technology”, implying skill-biased technological change.
In particular, computers have created the technological change: less-educated and un-
skilled workers are pushed out of jobs by robotization; thus the demand for routine
work decreases since it can be mechanized, outsourced or offshored. At the same time,
the demand for non-routine work—how to make the robots—increases (Autor et al.
2003; Acemoglu 2002).
For Europe it is important to recognize that these changes in private sector labor
market demand were accompanied by the expansion of the (semi-)public sector,
which is far more higher education-intensive than the private sector. This contrib-
uted to a market scarcity for higher-educated workers in the private sector, adding
to the upward pressure on wages of well-trained workers, while the public sector
wages follow the private sector’s wage-setting. In other words, the disequalizing
wage effect of the technologic change, which enhanced the relative demand for
well-trained workers, was enhanced by the expansion of the (semi-)public sector in
Europe. It was further enhanced by the emulation on bonuses and top earnings in
the private sector.
OECD (2011) and Chusseau et al. (2008) document how increased imports from low-
income countries (including outsourcing) also pushed out routine labor jobs in OECD
countries. At the same time, according to these studies, the effect of the rapid rise in
the integration of trade and financial markets has hardly impacted the relative shift in
labor demand, in favor of highly-skilled workers.
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in relation to median wages between the 1980s and 2008 (OECD 2011, p.30). This was
a result of decreasing union power, even though the coverage of collective bargaining
generally remained rather stable over time. The immigration of low-skilled workers
contributes little to rising wage inequality (Heckman et al. 1998).
Income inequality
The OECD (2011, p.22) reports that income inequality in the 27 OECD countries has
risen from 1975 to 2008: real household income at the bottom decile grew by 1.3% per
year while growth in the top decile was some 50% higher (namely 1.9%) because the re-
distributive impact of taxation and transfers has decreased in the past decades and be-
cause of increased inequality in wages and in non-wage incomes.
Social cohesion
Social cohesion is a notoriously vague concept (Wilkinson 1997), despite all efforts at
measurement through social capital (Putnam 2000) or otherwise. At the same time, it
is used in practically every major document from EU member states as a major precon-
dition for the functioning of European democracies. In Europe a low level of income in-
equality is generally viewed as a precondition for social cohesion. This is in contrast to
the US, where a high level of income inequality still (irrationally) seems to signal that
there is a chance for “every paperboy” to become a millionaire, presumably based on
the (false) assumption that intergenerational mobility is larger if income inequality is
greater; the OECD (2008, p.213) has shown that intergenerational mobility is greater
when income inequality is smaller.
When launching the OECD (2011) report, the OECD Secretary General Angel
Gurría, in the context of the impact of increasing income inequalities on social cohe-
sion, said: “The social contract is starting to unravel in many countries.”2.3 Employment protection, minimum wages and the quality of work
Employment protection is specified in legislation, collective agreements or individual
employment contracts. This is what we call EPL (employment protection legislation),
well knowing that in practice EPL depends on the interpretation of rules by courts or
tribunals and the effectiveness of enforcement.
The impact of EPL (in all of its different forms) on employment, the duration of un-
employment, labor mobility and on firm-specific human capital accumulation has been
widely studied. Special attention is often given to differences in employment protection
for temporary contracts and for permanent workers. Martin and Scarpetta (2012) pro-
vide a critical review of the recent empirical evidence on the links between regulations
affecting the hiring and firing of workers, labor reallocation and productivity growth:
“The upshot is that employment protection impacts significantly on labor market flows
and these flows, in turn, have significant impacts on productivity growth.” (p.20) The
OECD (2009, p.121) finds that an average of about 3% of jobs are destroyed in some in-
dustries each year, while an equal number of jobs are created in others. Since the corre-
sponding average net employment growth in the business sector was about 1
percentage point, this suggests that reallocation of labor resources across industries is
three times as large as net aggregate employment growth. But sizeable net employment
changes at the industry level hide much greater churning at the firm level. Within
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destroyed but were offset by new matches with other firms and/or with other workers
within the same industry. This 15% figure agrees with the overall notion of jobs “exist-
ing” for no more than some six years on average, requiring substantial labor mobility.
Employment protection may reduce mobility from declining in growing industries or
within firms with disappearing jobs to newly emerging jobs. It may also have negative im-
plications for aggregate economic and labor market outcomes, even though it is likely that
workers pay themselves for the costs of labor protection through lower wages (the Lazear
hypothesis, confirmed by the empirical evidence of Leonardi and Pica 2013 for Italy).
The negative effects of employment protection on innovation and employment are
widely established by Boeri and Garibaldi (2009), Bartelsman et al. (2011) and Murphy
et al. (2012).
Since 1980 onwards, this consideration has been the basis for most OECD countries
in order to carry out regulatory reforms to “loosen employment protection legislation
(EPL) for workers with temporary contracts” (OECD 2011, p.30). The side effect is that
firms have engaged in more hiring of temporary contract workers (Draeger and Marx
2013). Loosening protection for temporary workers, while not reducing the protection
in permanent contracts, has been tantamount in supporting a two-tiered labor market.
It demonstrates a well-protected upper part contrasting the lower base of temporary
contracts with little protection; the latter employs the most vulnerable, the least edu-
cated and younger workers.
Boeri and Garibaldi (2009) suggest considering unemployment benefits in relation to
job protection along iso-welfare curves. The authors point out that flexicurity (high un-
employment benefits with low protection) provides the same welfare as EPL in the
form of high unemployment protection with low unemployment benefits while flexicur-
ity offers (potentially substantial) benefits to society due to increased mobility.
It is important to recognize the substantial differences in EPL between EU countries,
as one can see in Figure 1.
The minimum wage
In most EU member states, the wage level of workers with low education levels is
mostly determined by a general minimum wage per hour for all workers. Germany has
been until now one of the exceptions, although there were minimum wages for a large
number of sectors organized by unions and employers, as well as some determined by
public intervention; however, it plans the introduction of a general minimum wage on
January 2015 (Arni et al. 2014). Minimum wage legislation aims at ensuring that a per-
son who works full time is able to sustain himself or herself, as well as a family, with
the wage income. The impact of a minimum wage on both income distribution and on
employment has been an issue of considerable debate1. The key concern is the degree
of the employment loss among low-wage workers and the resulting impact on poverty
levels. How much unemployment results from the introduction of a minimum wage or
a raise thereof mainly depends on the degree to which workers are affected, the size of
the wage change for them and the respective labor demand elasticity. Additionally, the
spillover effects of an increase in wage costs on output prices might also have an effect
through a reduction of general demand. And further people either non-participants or
new immigrants may enter the labor force. Minimum wages only reduce poverty
Figure 1 Protection of regular workers against individual and collective dismissals, 2013 (OECD
countries). Source: OECD 2013.
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wage.
Minimum wages in the EU are often set at such low levels that only a small share of
jobs is affected, and the effects on employment are negligible. The minimum wages
range from about one euro per hour in Romania and Bulgaria to about 10 euro in
France and Luxembourg. It is likely that these minimum wages reduce income inequal-
ity while not or hardly affecting employment. Yet high minimum wages may have a ser-
ious impact: a recent study by Cahuc et al. (2013) shows that the numerous young
people out of work in France, as compared to Germany, is associated with the high
French minimum wage. They show that if the French minimum wage were applied to
young workers (excluding apprentices) in Germany, then it would affect the majority of
young current German workers; 55 percent of young Germans now cost their employer
less than the equivalent cost of the minimum wage in France (p.14). At the same time
most studies done for the US (for example Teulings 2003) and for the OECD (such as
OECD 2011) show that the relative decrease in the minimum wage level—as experi-
enced in many OECD countries over the past decades—is one of the sources but not
necessarily one of the causes of increased income inequality. This conclusion is drawn,
for instance, without accounting for the positive impact of the decrease in the relative
minimum wage on employment. Sabia et al. (2012) show that the 39 percent increase
in the New York state minimum wage in 2005–2007 (from the federal rate of $5.15
to $7.15) had “substantial adverse labor demand effects for low-skilled individuals”.
(p.350) and consequently had a negative effect on the income distribution.Labor force participation and the retirement age
Labor force participation rates differ substantially between EU countries mostly due to
very different social security and pension regulations. Some countries have moved the
retirement age upwards, in alignment with life expectancy and demographic develop-
ment (with more old-age persons relative to the working population). Others, such as
France and Germany, continue to lower the pension age. Replacement rates are also
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2.4 Greening
We use the term “greening” to indicate a process towards sustainability. The vibrant sce-
nario aims at more greening within the European economies. Policies towards more
greening, like the German Atomausstieg, affect employment. More greening in a country
may lead to higher prices for products and services, making the country less competitive.
The progress—or lack of greening—can be measured by an ecological footprint (how
many resources we use in relation to available resources). The ecological footprint rep-
resents the amount of biologically productive land and sea area it takes to supply the
resources a human consumes and to assimilate associated waste (WWF 2012, p.135).
For 2007 it was estimated that humanity as a whole used resources 1.5 times as quickly
as Earth can renew.
Expressed in footprint hectares (ha) and bio-capacity per citizen, the range through-
out Europe is considerable: Denmark has the largest footprint of 8.3 ha with a bio-
capacity of 4.8 ha while the smallest is in Romania at 2.8 ha (bio-capacity of 2.3 ha)
(WWF 2012, p.144). The EU’s average footprint is 4.6 ha with a bio-capacity of 2.2 ha.
These footprint data include the carbon footprint, in such a way that the required nat-
ural sequestration is estimated to maintain a constant concentration of carbon dioxide
(CO2) in the atmosphere. For example, in 2008, one global hectare could absorb the
CO2 released by burning approximately 1,450 liters of gasoline (WWF 2012, p.137).
2.5 Happiness and the labor market
The socio-economic environment’s impact on people’s individual well-being has been
advanced as a potentially important evaluation criterion for socio-economic policy, as
first formulated by Easterlin (1974). A person’s enduring level of happiness is an experi-
ence brought about by personal factors and important external factors such as income,
work, community and governance (corruption, freedom, social support), as well as
values and religion.
When people become unemployed, they experience sharp falls in well-being, which
remain at this lower level until they are re-employed (Helliwell et al. 2013, p.66). Lalive
and Stuetzer (2011, p.21–22) agree, although they find that the impact is somewhat
lessened by the level of unemployment benefits.
High unemployment has spillover effects not only on the families of the unemployed,
but also on those working since they feel less secure in their jobs. When we sum up the
entire loss in well-being of a rise in the unemployment rate, the total is twice as large as
the loss to the unemployed themselves, according to Helliwell et al. (2013, p.67).
In other words, one of the most important aspects of the labor market in terms of
well-being is whether individuals are able to find a job, given that they want one. This
is a clear call for a full employment policy as a “happiness strategy”.
Employment and happiness
For those who are employed, the quality of life at work is important. The trade-off be-
tween the level of (macro) employment and the quality of work for those who are
employed then needs to be envisaged.
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the probability of being satisfied by 7 percentage points from the baseline, while the
importance of employment protection for happiness of permanent contract workers de-
creased between 2000 and 2005.
Workers’ well-being matters not only for themselves but also for firms: it is a good
predictor of productivity. It is well-known that workers who are more satisfied with
their jobs are less likely to quit; they are also less likely to reduce firm productivity via
absenteeism or presenteeism—showing up for work but contributing little (Robertson
and Cooper 2011; Cooper and Lundberg 2011).
The bottom line remains one given by Gruen et al. (2010), using the German Socio-
Economic Panel:
“…we cannot identify a single job feature or a combination of such features that
constitute such low quality jobs that remaining unemployed would be the better
choice for the individual. On the contrary, the bulk of our evidence shows that even
low quality jobs are associated with higher life satisfaction, and this effect is
statistically significant for most specifications of “bad” jobs.”
Similarly, a parallel study examines the value of the large German workfare program
and concludes that people’s life satisfaction rises substantially after moving from being
totally out of work to being part of the program (Wulfgramm 2011).
It is likely that national happiness might decrease with a reduction in worker protec-
tion for those with permanent contracts. Yet it is equally likely that total happiness
increases if the same decrease in worker protection results in increased employment.
From OECD figures Europe appears to have been an overall happy continent in the
decade 2000–2010. When asked to rate their general life satisfaction on a scale from 0
to 10, people across the OECD averaged 6.7. Some countries—Hungary, Portugal,
Turkey and Greece—have a relatively low level of overall life satisfaction, with average
scores of less than 5.5. At the other end of the scale, scores were higher than 7.5 in
Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Switzerland. There is little difference in life
satisfaction levels between men (6.6) and women (6.7) across OECD countries. How-
ever, social status strongly influences subjective well-being. The bottom 20% of the
population in OECD countries has a life satisfaction level of 6.1. This score increases to
7.3 for the top 20%.
Unhappiness is concentrated in poorer countries such as in Bulgaria. Not only do ab-
solute happiness levels differ but their variations also differ between countries. Among
OECD countries the correlation between country means and standard deviations is
significantly negative (more variance when the mean is lower). Among those countries
with high average scores, some have quite high degrees of equality in the distribution
of happiness (Denmark and the Netherlands), while in some fairly low-ranking coun-
tries (Bulgaria and Romania) there is much more dispersion.
OECD countries with higher unemployment levels appear to be less happy, when
measured by the level of happiness or the degree of dispersion of happiness (more dis-
persion with more unemployment). This confirms the micro findings on individual
happiness and the individual (un)employment experience. More econometric research
is needed to confirm the result of this casual inspection.
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In this chapter we address the policies of the EU member states leveraged by the EU in
order to achieve a vibrant European economy with close to full employment (through
more innovation), less income inequality and more greening in the period 2014–2020.
We compare this with the status quo scenario, named “muddling through”. Muddling
through does not include major policy changes. We focus here on the labor market
without plunging into the financial or fiscal side. The inadequacy of the EU’s monetary
and fiscal instruments has been a major reason for its slow recovery, compared to the
US, in the post-crisis period (see Tables 1 and 2). These institutions are in the process
of repair. In both of our scenarios it is assumed that the financial framework for the
Eurozone and the EU as a whole is fixed, meaning that credit flows will resume to pre-
crisis levels and that fiscal consolidation continues to take place.
The labor market for the muddling through scenario is mostly derived from a Cedefop
study (2010). These are the only projections available. We consider these projections to
be too optimistic with respect to (the resumption of) employment growth and the reduc-
tion of unemployment, as they do not appear to depart from fiscal consolidation. Fiscal
consolidation in part implies a break away from public sector expansion (health, educa-
tion and general government services), having substantial implications for employment, in
particular for those with higher education. Fiscal consolidation has also been driven by in-
creases in taxes, with their negative employment effects. Lastly, the reduction in transfer
payments—included in fiscal consolidation—has reduced spending on consumption with
its consequences for employment.
In contrast to muddling through, the vibrant scenario aims to reach full employment
within the shortest possible timeframe and maintain it thereafter. Full employment is
achieved and maintained through more innovation, greater labor mobility, flexicurity,
work-related social security and less labor regulation embedded in policies which gen-
erate less income inequality (through restrictions on top wage incomes and focusing on
social security). This approach can be argued as contributing to increased happiness, in
terms of both level and distribution among the European population.
Labor market policy in the EU is the responsibility of each member state. At the
same time, the EU has the responsibility to deliver country-specific recommendations
(CSRs) regarding innovation and labor market policy as part of the semester approach.
We shall discuss how member states could more quickly implement these CSRs. The
major question is not whether such an alternative is possible. It is about governance:
are EU politicians and politicians of the member states, who would agree with the
“vibrant” goal of full employment, able to carry it out with the support of their
constituencies?The labor market 2010–2020
In the period 2008–2013, the EU has experienced a shaky economic development: EU
growth rates plummeted and the EU-27 entered a recession (−4.3% growth in 2009)
with a second dip in 2012 (−0.4%). Economies in other parts of the world are growing
faster than in the EU, notably in countries that are catching up, like China, India, Brazil
and Russia (the BRIC countries), Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey (the
MIST countries) and also in the US.
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wards a better-trained labor force continues unabatedly. Yet economic growth remains
sluggish while the level of innovation in Europe may be overtaken by countries outside
of Europe: Singapore ranks second in the 2013 World Economic Forum innovation
index and Hong Kong seventh (up two places from 2012); meanwhile relative indexes
worsened for the Netherlands, ranking eighth in 2013 (from fifth in 2012), and the UK
(from eighth to tenth, also in 2012 to 2013) (Cornell University, Insead and WIPO
2013).
The Cedefop (2010) predictions—which were computed before the major downturn
in employment—show that gradually employment demand should again grow enough
to absorb supply, so that unemployment by 2020 would not exceed 5–10%. And even
then, compared to the non-crisis scenario, some 90 million job years would be lost.
However, as we said: the Cedefop projections may be (far) too optimistic, because
they have not taken austerity measures into account. The first two years in the projec-
tions, 2012 and 2013, show mounting unemployment rather than a decrease. In
September 2013, the youth unemployment rate in the Eurozone was over 25 percent
and still increasing. It exceeded 30 percent in Italy, Portugal and Slovakia, while it was
over 57 percent in Greece and Spain. Youth unemployment rates were also high and
increasing in reasonably successful countries such as Belgium and Malta.
Unemployment continues to be unevenly spread across the EU. It also remains
skewed across education levels. People with low qualifications will continue to find it
difficult to obtain a job.
In summary, a continuation of present policies might gradually (in 2014 and there-
after) bring a reduction in EU unemployment. However the road to full employment
will be long and is unlikely to be achieved by 2020.A vibrant scenario
A vibrant European labor market with full employment would be first and foremost the
result of individual EU member countries’ policies, once the stability pact and the
Banking Union have been implemented and credit flows resume pre-crisis levels. These
fiscal and monetary policies have been belatedly brought to the European level as ne-
cessary complements to introducing the euro. Yet for employment and social policy,
the responsibilities largely remain with the EU countries’ national governments, albeit
that the European Commission (2013) wants to strengthen the “social dimension” of
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by using employment and social indicators
as part of the “European Semester” process for economic policy coordination.
At present, public debts and budget deficits attract the most attention in the Semester
process, in which EU member states’ governments have to submit their budget proposals
first to the EU, before presenting them to their national parliaments. The EU gives binding
criteria applied to the levels of government deficits and sovereign debt as in the stability
pact for the euro.
The European Parliament (2012) has called for strengthening the EMU with a “social
pact”, to be included in the Van Rompuy (2012) report, which restricted itself to four
pillars of the EU: financial integration, budgetary framework integration, economic pol-
icy integration and democratic legitimacy.
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Maastricht criteria in terms of government budget deficits and sovereign debt levels. It
is essential in order to avoid a substantial interest claim on government income, push-
ing out expenditures for education, health, social transfers and the like. Yet if it leads to
economic policies in which countries with substantial trade surpluses are inducing
wage reductions and slowing down public investment (in infrastructure or in public
R&D), then the single-minded application of fiscal consolidation may not serve its pur-
pose, as it smothers economic growth. Likewise “austerity” should not block needed re-
forms in the labor market structure, nor in other markets. Vibrancy would start with
adopting the policy goal of full employment, as this may serve as a reference point for
“smart austerity”.
Hence we suggest: Full employment should become an EU goal to be realized by
2020. The new European Parliament should demand an employment proposal from the
Commission that would have the potential to regain lasting full employment relatively
soon, as well as the implications for the Maastricht criteria and the Semester process.
The new European Commission (which starts in December 2020) should have a
mandate to engender full employment by 2020.
The goal of full employment translates into five policies: innovation (3.1), income
(3.2), mobility (3.3), immigration (3.4) and greening (3.5).
Aside from an EU-wide agreement on full employment as a policy goal, a social
scoreboard might be helpful. This would be done with agreed measurements and objec-
tives and ensure that the EU leverages both economic and social goals in EU countries.
Poverty levels and social goals would be recorded next to macroeconomic and employ-
ment indicators.
Automatic stabilizers at the EU level could also be a “leveraging” European approach
to help individual EU countries reach their economic and social goals. Automatic stabi-
lizers have been amply researched (Peichl et al. 2013), for example in the form a fiscal
union or a European unemployment scheme, in which a minimum level of unemploy-
ment benefits would come from a European fund for a maximum duration of one year.
However, this is a difficult proposition since it involves distributional consequences as
well as moral hazards.
Social goals need to be narrowed down to a small set of basic needs with a clear view
on full employment as the best social policy. Too much spending on social protection
will undermine competitiveness. It is critical to maintain a link between wages and
productivity, allowing room for collective bargaining. Keeping this link also means that
high-productivity countries should allow wages to increase.3.1 Innovation
Economic growth and employment projections hinge on assumptions regarding
innovation and competitiveness. There are few signs that the EU-27 takes the vibrancy
challenge seriously (in contrast to the language used in the Lisbon declaration of 2000)
as expressed for example by the outlays for research and development or the relative
absence of “yollies” in Europe compared to the US. The increased outlays for public
R&D and for the improvement of educational quality in BRIC, many MIST and in the
oil-rich Arab countries, has little following in Europe, except for some “excellence
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is likely that, on average, European countries will find themselves falling on the Global
Innovation Index; instead of six EU countries making the top-ten list in 2013, there
may be no more than three or four in 2020.
The Horizon 2020 program (in the EU Framework Programme for Research and
Innovation) foresees an EU outlay of some 70 billion euros for the period 2013–2017.
The EU Commission (2012) feels that the EU should specialize, as well as compete glo-
bally, in green economy, healthcare and information and communications technology
(ICT). This H2020 program is a major increase in the European public research effort,
even though it constitutes less than 10% of the total EU budget. In parallel, the agricul-
tural subsidies budget remains at around 50%, making the EU more about milk and
wine, or butter and beef, rather than knowledge. At the same time, many member
states have cut their R&D outlays (Hoareau et al. 2012).
A vibrant scenario
More public R&D, less entrepreneurial regulation, better quality education and more
credit for startups can raise labor productivity in the longer run. However, R&D out-
comes are not only about money; the organization of R&D plays a major role. It is clear
that there are huge differences between EU states regarding the effectiveness of public
R&D expenditures, whether measured in citations, patents, knowledge-based startups,
or in “entrepreneurship”.
A new convergence in per capita incomes between EU member states could arise
from stronger human capital and R&D positions in the poorer countries. In this re-
spect, it is counterintuitive to notice that structural and cohesion funds—meant to
bring about convergence—are hardly allocated toward universities or R&D, with the ex-
ception of Poland (see country reports in Hoareau et al. 2012).
Innovation cannot be enacted by law, nor be taught at school as to how it can be
generated, even though entrepreneurship education could have a substantial impact on
innovation. Policies should rather be designed to incentivize and enhance an environ-
ment for more private innovation. This is concerned with lessening bureaucracy, easing
patenting, reducing costs and standardizing treatment of intellectual property rights.
European education systems are typically very formal, which is arguably not the best
pre-condition for future innovation, since this cannot be taught at school or university.
It rather needs an education system that not only allows for but actually encourages
creativity from the very beginning of (preschool) education while at the same time ex-
plicitly pays attention to entrepreneurship training.
Our following policy recommendations to stimulate innovation (as a means to gener-
ate employment) for the EU member states are then:
 Provide more public R&D closely related to industry
 Increase the ease of doing business (World Bank Doing Business report: ease of
doing business index)
 Give more attention to entrepreneurship education at all education levels
 Implement dual education at all education levels (including higher education) after
the age of 16
 Provide more (pre)venture capital
Ritzen and Zimmermann IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 15 of 242014, 3:10
http://www.izajoels.com/content/3/1/10At the EU level, several steps could be taken:
 Ease patenting through a simple European patent to supersede national regulations
 Allocate 50% of cohesion and structural funds to higher education and public
research
The most radical proposal for the EU to leverage individual member states is:
 Allow additional R&D expenditures in EU countries (above the status quo) to
remain outside of the Maastricht criteria3.2 Inequality
The implications of the labor market demand and supply forecasts all point in the dir-
ection of an increasing wage-income inequality under the muddling through scenario.
The increased wage inequality will translate to increases in income inequality. Income
inequality will be further enhanced in Europe through the following processes:
 Income inequality between European countries will decrease less than in the past as
the “convergence machine” seems to have halted; the differences in growth rates
between richer and poorer countries seem to be less (OECD 2012), implying that
the gap remains between richer and poorer countries.
 Income inequality also increases because of the continued increase in capital
income that mainly serves higher incomes.
 The room for more progressive taxation is not considered to be a serious
alternative: governments seem to be moving in the direction of a “flat tax”.
 The room for inequality reduction through social expenditures is under pressure as
a result of the sovereign debt crisis.
As a result it is likely that we will see a worsening of the European Gini coefficient, even
more than that of the first decade of the 21st century when it increased by about 5%.
A vibrant scenario
The vibrant scenario implies more innovation compared to the muddling through sce-
nario. But this also means that the demand for well-trained workers is higher in this
scenario, which if anything leads to more wage inequality as a result of the greater bar-
gaining power of well-trained workers.
Wage inequality can be reduced by raising wages at the bottom through increased de-
mand, like expanding the (lagging) demand for low-skilled work by developing the ser-
vice sector or by creating public jobs for low-skilled workers. Currently large parts are
hidden in Europe’s shadow economy, estimated to account for up to one‐sixth of GDP
in Germany alone (Schneider 2003). The Belgian scheme of service checks has been
helpful in creating additional demand for low-skilled workers.
Kolev and Saget (2010) address policies to mitigate earnings inequality. Regarding the
low-end of the labor market, policies to reduce inequality should target the labor sup-
ply, such as providing workers with better skills and training; additionally policies also
need to focus on labor demand measures, such as investment in job creation, as well as
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collective bargaining and minimum wages.
At the upper part of the wage distribution there is room for limiting the rising top
earnings, along the lines of the adopted Swiss referendum (of March 2013). This refer-
endum says: no more golden hellos, no more golden parachutes, no more bonuses
linked to merging a company with another and a binding vote on executive pay by
shareholders. Pension funds holding shares in a company would be obligated to take
part in votes on compensation packages. Violations could result in fines equal to up to
six years of salary and a prison sentence of up to three years.
A European-wide dialogue with the private sector on maximum wages (excluding the
rewards of entrepreneurial work, i.e. risk taking with potential private losses) might
bring about such caps on non-entrepreneurial income Europe-wide, avoiding the po-
tential for escape by moving from one EU country to another.
The exodus of top talent by emigration to regions outside of Europe (to the US or
Australia) of such a regulation is likely to be minimal, if one can generalize the findings
for the US (Young and Varner 2012) for Europe. They conclude that top-income taxes
in California do not lead to observable tax flight. They also studied the migration
patterns of New Jersey’s millionaires before and after 2004, when the state imposed a
“millionaire’s tax” that raised rates on those earning $500,000 or more to 8.97% from
6.37% and conclude that “millionaire flight” is a myth. However, Vedder (2003) finds a
substantial impact of tax rate increases on out-migration from one US state to another.
Moreover, the vibrant scenario should also look for policies to combine smart growth
with a return to a more redistributive tax and transfer policy (Atkinson 2013). De-
creases in the bottom income tax rates, or the introduction of a luxury rate of VAT,
can contribute to fiscal consolidation and help ensure that the burden of fiscal adjust-
ment can be more fairly shared. The merits of an increase in the income tax top rate
are debatable.
Perhaps the impact of a “millionaire’s tax” in Europe, if applied Europe-wide, would
not lead to substantial emigration. The introduction of a millionaire tax in France in
2012 with a number of high-publicity flight cases will perhaps be a good case study, al-
beit that this was a tax only for residents in France thus evasion was easy by moving
across the border to nearby European countries. Zoutman (2014) argues that top rates
are already beyond revenue maximizing.
Limiting top incomes would have a strong impact on income inequality in the upper-
most income bracket (top 1%). At the same time the possible increase in entrepreneur-
ial income and capital income—as may be expected from a more vibrant scenario—
may offset the income, reducing the impact of the top income limitation brought about
by shareholder constraints.
The incentives to engage in regular work could be found in the workfare principle:
there is no financial support without work or commitment to further education
(Schneider and Zimmermann 2010). Rinne and Zimmermann (2012) argue that import-
ant factors that have recently contributed to the strong German employment resilience
have stemmed from the 2003 Hartz market reforms, the extension of short-time work,
the behavior of social partners and automatic stabilizers in social security expenditures.
The impact of these reforms in Germany seems to have clearly reduced income in-
equality (Grabka et al. 2012).
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converge faster with higher income countries. This means de facto that they should
quickly switch from imitation to innovation technologies. The policy described above,
focusing on cohesion and structural funds for 50% for R&D and higher education,
might be helpful for such a switch.
Therefore the following are policy recommendations for a vibrant scenario for EU
member states:
 Introduce or augment income support for the working poor based on family
circumstances through tax credits. If minimum wages are politically necessary they
should remain low to avoid the destruction of jobs which require little education.
 Introduce wage subsidies where labor demand is failing and where there is a
“social” demand for work which requires less education (e.g. the Belgian example of
the service checks or concierges at school).
 Uphold income-related prices for public services, with consideration of the poverty
trap.
 Engage in a European-wide dialogue with the private sector on maximum wages
(excluding the rewards of entrepreneurial work, i.e. risk taking with potential
private losses) to bring about Europe-wide caps on non-entrepreneurial income.3.3 Mobility policy
It is unlikely that the muddling through scenario, even with increased innovation, could
reach full employment by 2020 because of (too) low labor mobility within and between
EU member states. Existing jobs disappear while new, different jobs appear as the half-
life of jobs is decreasing in line with the half-life of products and production techno-
logies. In the process, routine work in particular will continue to disappear due to
robotization. If workers do not switch from jobs (in the sense of a given set of tasks) to-
wards newly emerging jobs, either because they are immobile or have not upgraded
their skills, then we could enter into a stage with substantial unemployment in combin-
ation with a substantial unfulfilled demand for labor. Full employment can only be real-
ized if individual workers feel responsible for their own employability by being mobile
and through upgrading their skills. In this respect, employment protection is a mis-
nomer since it cannot protect the worker from non-employability.
A vibrant scenario
The vibrant scenario is defined as having increased labor mobility within and between
EU countries with EU member states at the helm; this would be leveraged by the EU as
a knowledge clearing house (on what works and what does not), with country specific
recommendations and guidelines.
Increased labor mobility is needed because of the reduced half-life time of products,
because of the creative destruction of jobs due to innovation, and because of
unemployment differences between industries, regions and countries.
In the vibrant scenario the level of job protection for temporary contracts is in-
creased while that for permanent contracts is reduced. Many different measures are
needed. We distinguish between member state and EU policy.
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general notion is that unemployment should not occur if a job is lost, because workers
anticipate the disappearance of the job and timely “hop” to another one. An incentive
for anticipation is:
 Reconstruct severance pay in permanent employment in the Austrian way as
accumulated savings that can be transferred to another job.
Other incentives are:
 Paid leave during the notice period for the purpose of job seeking (e.g. 5–20 days)
 Sponsorships enabling individuals to try out a new job to see if it suits both parties
(trial periods)
 Support while starting a new business (for example, low interest credit)
 Regular training (general and firm-level) for employed individuals to maintain
employability, in worker adaptability to both the knowledge economy and
technological change; making this a legal right for all labor contracts would be an
important counterbalance for less worker protection
 Further improvement of employment service through the provision of information
about labor market and training possibilities, training, personal guidance, advice
and counseling (on education and career choices), coaching on job search
processes, and personal development activities individually or in groups (starting at
the moment of the dismissal notice)
 For those who still experience unemployment, EU member states would have
“flexicurity” (high benefits for a short search period), including well-functioning
employment services
The EU’s role in coordination with the member states on mobility policy could be:
 Engage in active policy towards the implementation of country-specific
recommendations for the labor market in individual member states, perhaps by
discussions on these recommendations between the European Parliament and
national parliaments.
 Ease fiscal and monetary constraints (Maastricht criteria) according to an agreed
framework for member states that sign up for reform aimed at full employment.
 Improve mobility across European member states by improving language skills
(compulsory English as a second language starting at an early age).
 Ensure full integration of intra-EU mobility through migrant language programs.
 Recognize degrees and work experience of other EU countries.
 Create EU-wide pension systems, as proposed by the EU for academics, which are
not country-dependent.3.4 Jump-starting youth employment
Muddling through with youth unemployment is an unhealthy option because of the
scarring effects of youth unemployment which would still be visible some 20 to 30 years
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into a long-run employment policy aimed at full employment. The youth employment
guarantee of the EU bears serious political risks if there is no job at the end of the guar-
antee period (See Cahuc et al. 2013 for further discussions).
A vibrant scenario
As an additional measure, one could think to introduce a European social youth loan
scheme, for example totaling 50 billion euro for the years 2014 and 2015. The notion
would be that every young EU citizen between the age of 20 and 30 could take out a
loan for a maximum of 40,000 euro at an interest rate of the government lending rate
plus 2% (for default and administrative costs). It would be a personal loan that would
have to be paid back according to social loan schemes. This would be similar to what
some EU countries do for education loans. Basically it means one would never have to
repay more than 10% of his or her income; additionally, at some point (after 20 or
25 years) if there is still a remainder of the loan, it would be written off.
The loan would have to be spent in the EU within two years following procurement
(any unspent amount would be repaid immediately). It could not to be used to “play
the stock market” or to save. At the same time the conditions should not be too strict
in order to keep administrative costs as low as possible.
The loans should not lead to contraction of credit available for other purposes. Hence
it is assumed that the European Central Bank would accommodate it in the money flow
as a focused form of quantitative easing. In this way a monetary impulse is provided in
spending while giving young Europeans a chance to start a business, to study, or to in-
vest in his or her own human capital in other ways. The EU policy brief on youth
entrepreneurship (2012) shows that 40% of young Europeans have an interest in start-
ing a firm of their own. A loan scheme as proposed might help to realize this interest.3.5 Vibrant immigration
Immigration is not a popular issue with the average European (Zimmermann 1995).
Nonetheless, the EU needs to continue to view immigration from outside the EU for its
potential to reduce the emerging shortages of well-trained people, in view of the devel-
opment of European demographics (Zimmermann 2005). At the same time the EU
needs to deal with the pressure for immigration into the EU which now mostly evolves
through asylum seeking and refugee admission policy, aside from family reunion.
Additionally, significant resources have been mobilized to fight human smuggling and
trafficking networks in the EU.
Asylum seeking is one part of recent immigration. It is a highly contested and often a
human drama. The great majority of the asylum requests are rejected, yet it is then
often difficult for the rejected asylum seeker to return home without documents, which
may be lost or nonexistent.
Active labor recruitment is still only a minor part of immigration (slightly higher than
the number of those seeking asylum). EU policies encourage labor recruitment, while
immigration policy is often focused on two areas: preventing both unauthorized migra-
tion as well as illegally employing migrants lacking work permits, and promoting the
integration of immigrants into society.
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2012, aimed at attracting well-educated workers by granting them the right to work
and live in a specific EU country. Also it might be well advised to leave room for immi-
gration into the EU for those who do not satisfy the Blue Card criteria; this can be
achieved through a regulated quota system based on labor market needs as an alterna-
tive to the “asylum route”.
European immigration policy could learn from the Israeli and US experiences, where
all immigration is in principle temporary and where permanent status is achieved only
after a couple of years. At present, this differs between EU member states.
In summary:
 A more clear-cut and focused immigration policy is needed, while at the same time
efforts should be enhanced towards integration, particularly for the second and
third generation children at school.
 It is equally important to develop a political base for a labor-market oriented
immigration policy.
 A first step would be to expand Blue Card access to the whole European labor
market, not just within the arrival country.
 A second step would be to expand the Blue Card to well-educated immigrants, even
if they do not have a job offer.
 As a third step, non-European students graduating with a Master’s degree or equivalent
from (selected) European universities should be automatically eligible for a Blue Card.
 Apply anti-discrimination regulations more strictly.
 Asylum requests are only accepted when filed from outside of Europe (either in the
first country after leaving the home country or at European borders).
 Leave room for immigration into the EU for those who do not satisfy the Blue Card
criteria, based on a regulated quota system for labor migrants.
 Immigration is in principle temporary; the permanent status is achieved after a
couple of years.3.6 Sustainability
There is little leeway for enhanced greening policies in countries with considerable un-
employment and faltering economic growth. In the period 2014–2020, no major green-
ing initiatives can realistically be expected under the present growth and employment
prospects, despite the obvious need for more greening as a “no-regret” scenario.
Even in countries that successfully overcame the crisis, like Germany, further greening
policies are at risk. This is exemplified with the remarkable and daring Atomausstieg in
Germany where the closure of their nuclear reactors by 2020 will imply a substantial rise
in the price of energy. The decision followed earlier German greening initiatives like the
feed-in tariff for locally produced “clean” energy, costing some 17 billion euros in 2010.
Both the feed-in tariff and the Atomausstieg have resulted in substantial energy price in-
creases, as well as political backlash.
A vibrant scenario
Greening (a smaller footprint) raises prices in such a way that goods and services with
a larger footprint will have the largest price increase. In this way, a shift in
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an average price increase for the total basket of consumption goods. Such a price in-
crease would in part mitigate the increase in welfare of this “vibrant scenario” policy
package measures, leading to more innovation and higher economic growth.
It is unclear how additional greening efforts could impact the composition of employ-
ment. If greening is aligned with innovation, the impact on employment is positive (as
is the intention of Atomausstieg).
The increased prices of “ungreen” goods and services might impede European firms’
exports and thus impact its international competitiveness. However, this need not be
the case if Europe (either by Kyoto-type agreements or WTO negotiations) can create a
level playing field. WTO negotiations can help create this if the EU can levy import
taxes on “ungreen” goods and services to a level which would adjust the import price
to include the added costs the EU bore in order to make its production greener.3.7 Happiness
From the aforementioned points of the impact of income, its distribution and un-
employment, it is obvious that Europe’s average level of happiness is likely to decrease
in the years to come. This is primarily due to the impact of unemployment, both on
the unemployed as well as on the employed. At the same time, the happiness distribu-
tion across EU member states will greatly vary. This was documented by the OECD
(2013a, b) which showed that between 2007 and 2012, average life satisfaction declined
by more than 20% in Greece, 12% in Spain and 10% in Italy.
A vibrant scenario
Some consideration could be given to happiness, which is a function of unemployment
(negative relation), EPL (positive relation) and income, in a world with rapidly changing
jobs. Overall it can be argued that the vibrant scenario is superior to muddling through as
it comes closer to full employment, leads to more growth and less inequality and to more
greening, while realizing that there are “happiness costs” involved in reducing employ-
ment protection and increasing labor mobility within and between EU countries.4 Summary and conclusions
Fixing the Eurozone’s financial framework, as well as the banking sector, is critical in
order to reach a level of economic activity which can reduce European unemployment
to an acceptable level by 2020. Yet in the meantime, some 90 million job years are lost,
while it is unclear if labor productivity will continue to increase at pre-crisis levels, or if
economic growth will pick up sufficiently in order to reduce unemployment in the EU
at large. This “muddling through” scenario also means that earlier developments such
as increasing wage and income inequality will continue and that there is little or no
room for more vigorous greening efforts. Muddling through puts Europe behind other
nations in terms of world relevance, making it more difficult to participate in and influ-
ence others during worldwide negotiations on human rights, peace, environmental is-
sues and trade. In contrast, a “vibrant” scenario involves more innovation, less income
inequality, greater labor mobility, a selective immigration policy and increased greening.
The vibrant scenario has the potential to raise happiness by focusing on reaching full
employment.
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tion legislation (EPL), taxation, social security and greening in the period 2014–2020.
In contrast, a vibrant scenario contains major reforms for the driving factors of
innovation (including higher education and public research), combined with substantial
changes in EPL and taxation/social security, as well as in CO2 worldwide emission
regulation. In this way, the vibrant scenario creates a promising foundation for full em-
ployment, less income inequality, more growth and higher sustainability.
Vibrancy in the EU is hard to imagine without adjustments in the welfare state’s
organization. In particular, employment protection legislation in most EU countries
needs to be reconsidered. Temporary jobs have been a savior of employment, yet do
not provide enough opportunities for training. EU countries should allow for more
training possibilities for temporary contracts and at the same time stimulate mobility
for permanent contracts. In the tradeoff with competitiveness, Europe should not lower
social standards or work quality, but instead aim to generate full employment with in-
creased labor mobility.
It is important to focus on the reduction of income inequality within and between
EU countries as part of creating the vibrant scenario. There are many ways to halt ris-
ing income inequality within countries. Special attention must be paid to the working
poor: some 19 million Europeans are not able to provide food or clothing for their chil-
dren (European Commission 2012).
Demographics differ substantially between EU countries. Yet, the impact of the
demographic transition is likely to be much less harmful to the welfare system than ex-
pected for the EU as a whole; this is due to behavioral effects such as greater labor sup-
ply with higher wages due to increased worker shortages. EU demographics should lead
EU member countries to jointly devise an immigration policy based on labor market
needs, in particular the need for more well-trained workers.
“Happiness” might increase in the vibrancy process, as unemployment has such a
strong negative impact on the happiness of people who experience unemployment, but
also on the employed.Endnote
1Neumark (2014), among others, has argued that the minimum wage creates job
losses among the unskilled without fighting poverty effectively.
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